In September 2026, Germany entered the capacity market with the country’s first auction. Unlike the conventional electricity market, where actual electricity generated is traded, the capacity market trades the commitment to provide a guaranteed amount of generating capacity. The aim is to encourage investment in new power plants and energy storage systems, as well as, in the future, flexible electricity consumption, thereby ensuring security of supply even as the share of weather-dependent renewable energy sources increases.
The European Commission has approved the initial capacity mechanism, under which capacity is to be delivered starting in 2031. Additionally, the German government is planning to introduce a permanent, structural capacity mechanism, beginning in 2027. With an estimated cost between 15.6 and 35.2 billion euros, the measure opens new revenue options for plant operators and project developers. We spoke to Eva Zimmermann, lead expert for European battery markets at Aurora, about who can participate in the auctions, what economic potential they provide and which rules apply.
Basically, the EU has so far approved three auctions. One took place back in September, and another will follow in December. These two auctions involved – or will involve – several gigawatts of capacity to be procured. A third auction will follow in May 2027. After that, a regular capacity market based on annual auctions will be introduced for as long as additional capacity is needed. Many other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and Poland, have had such a regular capacity mechanism in place for some time.
One difference between the two capacity mechanisms is the amount of capacity put up for auction. The first two auction rounds in Germany involve a total of nine gigawatts, while the third round will add another two gigawatts. That is a substantial amount of capacity. Another important difference concerns the rules for bidders. In practice, the first two auctions are only open to large gas-fired power plants. Although the mechanism is often described as technology-neutral, this is not actually the case. Only the third auction in May will be somewhat more open, allowing the participation of battery storage systems, for example.
The reason is that the first two auctions require participating plants to be capable of supplying electricity for at least ten consecutive hours. Most new battery storage systems, however, are designed for a maximum discharge duration of four hours. After a three-hour break, a plant must then be able to feed electricity into the grid for another ten hours. This effectively rules out battery storage systems.
That is correct. Demand/response providers will only be able to participate in the long-term capacity market, which is expected to be significantly more technology-neutral.
Much about the May auction is still uncertain. The details will not be announced until March 30. A key aspect will be the derating factors applied to storage systems. I expect the auction to be designed to incentivize systems that can store and discharge energy over longer periods – probably anything beyond four hours. There is no minimum size requirement for storage systems so that theoretically, systems with shorter storage durations can also bid; however, they will have to expect lower revenues.
In Germany, building a storage system is always worthwhile. The marketing opportunities currently available are attractive enough in their own right. However, the capacity about to be auctioned will not be connected to the grid until the early 2030s. By then, we will have arrived at a point at which storage facilities need additional revenue streams. Many other markets that are lucrative today and will continue to be so through the early 2030s, are expected to become saturated, leading to lower earning potential.
A reliable revenue stream from capacity payments provides considerable financial security. This is also essential for financing. Banks place considerable value on storage systems with capacity market contracts, which guarantee a steady monthly income, ensuring that loans can be repaid − regardless of how well other markets are performing at any given time.
Storage systems with a dedicated grid connection can participate directly. Such front-of-the-meter systems typically have a capacity of at least one megawatt. For plants below that threshold, participation is generally not worthwhile because they cannot be marketed effectively.
Aggregators become more relevant under the long-term capacity mechanism, which is also open to behind-the-meter storage and industrial storage systems. The lack of a dedicated grid connection and additional purposes, such as optimizing self-consumption, makes the participation of these types of system considerably more complicated, though they can certainly be controlled through an aggregator. However, I would expect this option to be included in later auction rounds, after May.
Integrating different installations into the electricity market involves several levels, each with its own degree of difficulty and complexity. The first step will almost certainly be to integrate behind-the-meter storage – that is, large-scale storage systems in industrial and commercial buildings, as well as, to some extent, residential storage. These can be aggregated relatively easily. I would expect the next step to be the aggregation of the storage capacity of electric vehicles, before demand/response starts to play a role. This is because many industrial processes cannot simply be shut down or paused at short notice just because electricity prices happen to be high. Doing so would significantly disrupt industrial operations, quality assurance and other processes. I therefore expect the potential of industrial, commercial and residential storage systems to be tapped first, followed by that of electric vehicles.
While foreign bidders are not eligible to participate in the December and May tenders, they can bid for several tender periods after that. In previous rounds, contracts have always had a term of 15 years, but in the future, contract terms will be either one, seven or 15 years. Foreign capacity providers will only be able to bid for one-year contracts. A number of additional conditions will also apply to ensure that a plant genuinely contributes to Germany’s supply security.
As is customary in auctions, price is the primary deciding factor, meaning that the bidder offering the lowest price wins the contract. At the same time, the level of remuneration per installed megawatt is determined by derating factors, which generally become more favorable with longer storage duration. This means that a storage system with a ten-hour storage duration receives a higher remuneration per megawatt than one with a three-hour storage duration.
I expect the aim is to incentivize longer storage durations specifically, so the market design gives such installations an economic advantage. However, this does not mean that certain technologies or storage sizes are explicitly favored while others are excluded. The incentive is created by the pricing mechanism.
Under the current mechanism, the price is capped at 244 euros per kilowatt. However, I do not expect this ceiling to be reached consistently in the auctions. Demand appears to be significantly higher than the capacity on offer, which is driving up competition. I would expect actual winning bid prices to be considerably lower than 244 euros per kilowatt.
Capacity market auctions in other countries with a longer tradition show that results can vary considerably from one round to another. In the most recent auctions, storage systems secured contracts with revenues ranging from 14 to 42 euros per kilowatt, although winning bids have reached as much as 85 euros per kilowatt in the past. I suspect that Germany will initially tend toward the lower end of this range.
Yes, definitely. In fact, they have to for the business case to be viable.
Actually, apart from the scheduled dates, we know little about these auctions. Many details remain unclear, including how demand can be aggregated, which derating factors will apply and what technical requirements will need to be met. We will have to wait for the regulator to release more information.
Yes, definitely. As far as storage is concerned, this approach only works because the systems are being built regardless of a capacity market. If there is also an opportunity to secure a capacity option, project developers and operators will naturally be keen to seize it. After all, an additional revenue stream can make a project more successful. Considering how late the relevant information is being made available, no one would launch a new project solely to serve the capacity market.
The exact terms of the May auction will be announced on March 30. Bids must be submitted by May 18, and the results will be announced on July 13. These are the dates to plan around.
There are several important lessons to be learned from the United Kingdom in particular, especially when it comes to natural gas-fired power plants. Many gas-fired power plants there were awarded contracts, but their bids were too low. Subsequently, the cost of building new power plants rose so sharply that the projects were never realized. This is obviously problematic when the capacity is needed. In the UK, too much emphasis was placed on large gas-fired power plants, and Germany now faces the same risk.
One important lesson, therefore, is that the German Federal Network Agency, which oversees the mechanism, should broaden the scope of the auctions to include incentives for smaller projects as well. A well-balanced mix of capacities reduces the risk of outages compared with a system that incentivizes only gas-fired power plants.
It is also important for the rules to be transparent and fair. They must not become too complicated, as is prone to happen in Germany. In particular, demand/response aggregation must be technically feasible. Otherwise, it will ultimately not be worthwhile.